DEALINGS WITH THE FIRM OF GREG AND BOWERS: A TRIBUTE TO THE WORK OF FREDSON BOWERS, 1905-1991

ONE GAUGE OF THE continuing importance of Fredson Bowers's contribution to textual criticism and editing theory and practice over the last several decades is the obligation to read him that you, as would-be editor, sooner or later feel, once your own initial hope that editing with a wing and a prayer would get you by has been disappointed, once you realise that you are not going to get shot of this editing obligation fast, that its difficulties are starting to look nasty and that, in fact, you are going to have to think it all through. Like most editors, you have not been trained for the job — courses in bibliography and research methods have been out of fashion in most English departments for twenty years. So first you flounder, then you read Fredson Bowers, and then things start to make sense. Some time later you realise that that sense is not the only kind, that his approach doesn't acknowledge some of your editorial disquiets, but what Bowers has indubitably given you — and you are grateful for it — is a powerful leg up: a useful textual vocabulary, confirmation of the attitude of respect for your author's intentions you probably began with, and highly elaborated working methods for the establishment of a reading text, based on a theory of copy-text aimed at securing those intentions and capable of adaptation to an immense variety of textual situations. Instead of being condemned to muddle through (at best), you find yourself possessed of a way of thinking and a methodology. You can start.

Obviously I'm speaking for myself — but for many others as well, I suspect. The number of others would have something to do with the sheer duration of Bowers's working life. He was born in 1905. His first two books were published in the 1940s (*Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy, 1587-1642* and *Principles of Bibliographical Description*). When Sir Walter Greg's 'Rationale of Copy-Text', distinguishing between accidentals and substantives as a basis for editors' choice of copy-text, appeared in 1950, Bowers, at the age of 45, seized upon what would become the cornerstone of an unremitting contribution to editing theory and practice that was to last (who could have expected it?) for a further forty years. He then worked on editions of Dekker and Dryden, and his influential *Textual and Literary Criticism* appeared in 1959, before the first volume of his *Centenary Edition of Hawthorne* was published in 1962 (*The Scarlet Letter* for the Ohio State University Press).

He was in his late fifties. That volume's 'Preface to the Text' set out for the first time in a detailed way the application of Greg's principle to a body of nineteenth century American literature. In 1967, *The Statement of Editorial Principles and Procedures*, a manual for editors of nineteenth century American texts and based on Greg's and Bowers's ideas, was published by the Center for Editions of American Literature (CEAA), which had emerged in 1963 out of various Modern Languages Association conferences. Thereafter, as general or textual editor of collected editions of Beaumont and Fletcher, Crane and William James, Bowers was at the peak of his influence, through his own work, through his students', and through his students' students'. When, in *Studies in Bibliography* in 1975, Hans Zeller commended to Anglo-American editors his 'New Approach to the Critical Constitution of Literary Texts' — a method which had been under development in Germany for some years and which was a fundamental challenge to Bowers's

approach — he admitted generously: 'It has not by any means attained the level of the applied Greg-Bowers principles, which display a greater refinement and more solid foundations than any other editing procedure known to me' (28, p.231).

Bowers's last essays in *Studies in Bibliography* (which he edited for over four decades) in the 1989 and 1990 issues, the former an expansion of a paper given in 1987, demonstrate a formidable grasp of detail in the service of an undimmed clarity of thought. These qualities I experienced personally when, in 1989, I submitted an article to that journal. David Vander Meulen, the assistant editor, replied first, with useful suggestions for improvement; but then I received a letter from Bowers — three closely-typed pages done, I think, on a very old IBM electric typewriter — analysing with helpful and polite devil's advocacy every strand of the argument, and saying encouraging things about his respect for the standard of the study of bibliography in Australia. I had assumed that he was on the masthead of the journal but not an active partner in the firm; I was wrong. He wrote his last paper for the April 1991 conference of the Society for Textual Scholarship, but went to hospital the night before the conference started. G. Thomas Tanselle read it for him, and Bowers died that night. In his presidential address to the Society in 1985 (he was 80), Bowers had remarked: 'textual criticism, and its application to the finished product of editing — like old age — as the phrase goes, is not for sissies'. We have, I believe, to grant him the personal application of *that*.

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Because of his longevity and influence, Bowers's ideas already have historical significance. This essay will attempt to trace some aspects of their development. Its occasionally critical spirit will, I hope, be read as a testimony to their continuing relevance and importance.[1] The emphases I recognise in his work will in part reflect recent developments in textual criticism and theory, but they will also arise from the opportunity of looking at Bowers's thinking, as best my unavoidably selective reading has allowed for this commemorative essay, in context and in sequence.[2] It has been an intriguing process for me: watching Bowers sticking determinedly to his guns over such a long period; realising afresh, but more sharply this time, that he chose the guns he did because they worked, rather than because he had first inspected their philosophical undercarriages (a pragmatic instinct that would finally cause him problems); concluding that those editorial weapons seem nevertheless to have been made of a more malleable material than those of some of his contemporaries.

In his essay of 1950, 'Current Theories of Copy-Text, with an Illustration from Dryden', Bowers immediately took up the responsibility of exploring and enunciating the ground-breaking implications of Greg's 'Rationale of Copy-Text' of the same year, and of supporting its central thrust with evidence from his own work on Dryden. Bowers's article lacks the achieved, easy confidence — the grace — of the considerably older Greg's writing. But it is a toughly confident, not a shrill voice that we hear. There is a feeling as of a personal declaration, the strain of an

announcement of position, in his pinning his colours to the mast of what he called Greg's 'strict differentiation' (1950, p.60) of accidentals and substantives — whereas Greg had said the distinction was 'practical, not philosophic'.[3] Bowers was applying a new pressure of his own, and he, rather than Greg, would henceforth take up the running. One senses his satisfaction in being able at this moment to declare unequivocally that, because it could now be seen that a first edition was more likely to transmit reliably the accidentals of the lost manuscript than any subsequent reprint set from a printed edition could do, the choice of the first edition as the editor's copy-text was henceforth 'logical and automatic' (1950, p.59). The editor should consult later editions only for changes in substantives which could represent revision on the part of the author, incorporating them into the copy-text.

Greg's and Bowers's advocacy of a reading text eclectically assembled in this way was an overturning of the work of 'the conservative [R.B.] McKerrow', as Bowers called him (1950, p.60). The famous bibliographer and founder of the Malone Society had died in 1940; his *Prolegomena for the Oxford Shakespeare* had appeared in 1939. In 1972 Bowers was to recall its effect on him: 'A close reading, even today, is a salutary experience; the impact in 1939, as I can testify, was memorable' (1972, p.81). McKerrow's conservatism, from Bowers's point of view, lay in his long-standing resistance to eclecticism by editors. He had insisted on maintaining the integrity of whatever edition was chosen as copy-text: for example, a second edition might be chosen if it were believed that the author had authorised some corrections in it. By 1939 he had come to the realisation that to take a reprint as copy-text was indefensible because of its greater distance than the first edition from the manuscript, and that if the editor was confident that Shakespeare had authorised some changes then he might incorporate them into the earlier printing chosen as copy-text. However if the level of revision seemed to speak of a more thorough-going involvement on the part of the author in the process then, according to McKerrow, 'we must accept all the alterations of that edition, saving any which seem obvious blunders or misprints'.[4] Although in 1950 Bowers took McKerrow to mean that all the substantive variants would have to be incorporated into the earlier edition chosen as copy-text,[5] by 1972 he had come to believe that the true meaning of this somewhat obscure sentence was, depressingly, what it literally said: that, for all intents and purposes, the reprint would *become* the copy-text (1972, p.89 n.15). Because in the choice of copy-text Greg had driven a convenient wedge between author and printer, it was only consistent for him to advocate that critical distinctions be made on an individual basis for all alterations in wording in the later printings. McKerrow had steadfastly avoided this conclusion because of the scope it gave editors for subjective choice between variant substantives: this was evidently why he shrank from envisaging a thoroughgoing amalgamation of the first and revised edition. That fell to Greg.

Bowers believed that McKerrow would have embraced Greg's principle of divided authority if he had lived to see it formulated (1972, pp.90-99). But the familiar ghost was not to be exorcised so easily. It is not clear that the distinction between substantives and accidentals was especially important to McKerrow, even though he had, Greg observed, evidently grasped it. After all, modernised editions

of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature ignore most of the accidentals in their copy-text and substitute a modern form. Old-spelling editions pay far greater respect to the forms (especially the spelling) in their copy-text, but the chances of those early printed editions reliably transmitting the forms in the manuscript are not great; tight justifications and the compositors' individual habits are apt to be more decisive factors.[6] Indeed, if anything, it has been the later experience of editing nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature (where the manuscript is often extant) which has retrospectively given Greg's 'Rationale' *its* rationale. As far as I know, Bowers never saw it this way,[7] but his eloquent account of the importance of knowing Hawthorne's style of punctuation in my opinion rightly values the intimacy with the idiosyncratic movement of an author's thinking which the use of manuscript as copy-text can often afford the reader (1972, p.90). It has proved to be true in the case of D.H. Lawrence. Moreover without accepting Greg/Bowers principles an editor cannot construct a single reading text of a work which preserves this intimacy and also incorporates the author's later revisions. This has been the strength of the position which Bowers gradually elaborated over the years.

That position can too easily be caricatured as monolithic; it was not. In 1962, Bowers argued that the expectation deriving from the editing of ancient texts, that a single text of the work can usually be established, did not necessarily transfer to the editing of printed literature. Where there was a manuscript tradition, the editor could, after studying patterns of textual corruption, produce a single text by isolating the 'best text' and emending it for corruption only (roughly, Karl Lachmann's method) or for readings in other manuscripts that the editor decided were superior (A.E. Housman's). But where, say, theatrical alterations complicate the textual authority of early printings of dramatic works, a critical edition aimed at securing the author's intentions might remain impossible, and the need instead for, say, two editions based on the competing documents would be the best that could be done, the aim of each being 'the closest reconstruction possible of its separate printer's copy' (1962:1, p.17). And there are cases, Bowers observed, of fundamental and thoroughgoing authorial revision of substantives and accidentals which challenge the expectation that a 'single established text can [always] be contrived' (1962:1, p.5): Whitman's successive *Leaves of Grass*, Wordsworth's *Prelude*, and Henry James's revisions of some of his novels for the New York edition. Bowers's argument here was, as always, that inspection of actual textual situations might force the modification or even rejection of preconceived editorial principles. But his explicit specification of cases where eclectic editing would not work, served as an implicit reinforcement of the expectation that, in most cases, it *would*. In any event there is no doubt that, over the years, it was found to — or made to — by many people.

Bowers himself was opposed to automatic or literal-minded application of the eclectic principles he had championed. In a brilliant article in 1972, he re-illustrated the importance of the Gregian approach in relation to Shakespeare, Fielding and nineteenth-century American literature ('The principle is sound', he declared, 'without regard for the literary period', 1972, p.86). Bowers then went on to outline means of editing stories by Stephen Crane which had originally been

published in newspapers in texts which radiate from lost, syndicated proofs. By analysing the variation in the newspaper texts, Bowers worked out methods of reconstructing the lost proofs. That state, being the closest retrievable one to the lost manuscript, could in essence become the copy-text — even though not extant. (This was a departure from copy-text principles which, incidentally, makes less remarkable Hans Gabler's editorial creation of a substitute for copy-text in his edition of Joyce's *Ulysses* of 1984, and ought to have made Gabler's work less open to some of the knee-jerk scepticism it received.) In 1985, Bowers would refer to 'the fruitless arguments whether a single methodology (like copy-text) can be developed to deal with [all textual situations]' (1985, p.2) and would remark that 'copy-text and its treatment became almost an obsession among the new American textual critics, that it dominated their discussions . . . with a rigidity of concept that was likely to take too little account of the flexibility inherent in working with the specialized problems of the early drama, and the equal flexibility that the printing and publication circumstances of later times demanded' (1985, p.5). To many members of the Society for Textual Scholarship (STS) listening to this presidential address, it must have sounded like apostasy.

Strictly, it should not have. One of the undoubted attractions of Greg's principle for Bowers had always been its flexibility: the responsibility and scope it gave editors to assess on an individual basis which variant readings in later printings were authorial. Bowers believed that the editor was in a better position than anyone else to make that category of critical judgment, and he believed it was a dereliction of duty for the editor to shirk it in favour of accepting all the plausible readings in the revised printing — a method which would collect all the authorial revisions but the non-authorial ones as well. He foresaw in 1950 that this new responsibility would not be favourably received by many editors. In 1985, finding a 'curious conservatism' among 'editors of American literature' (1985, p.5), he must have realised that his fears had materialised. Having exorcised McKerrow's ghost in 1950, he had found it re-emerging in a different form.

With authors of the last two hundred years there is rarely any editorial tradition, as there is with Shakespeare, to provide a context for the editor's decisions about the textual cruces. The job usually has to be done from scratch, and the reader must be able to follow the tendency of the editor's decisions. The editor feels the pressure to declare an orientation: whether to incorporate into the copy-text (often, the manuscript) or to reject all, or almost all, the alterations in the lost state (e.g. the proofs, where any particular alteration from copy-text could have been called for by the author, the press-corrector, perhaps the in-house copy-editor, or the compositor). The 'conservative' way is to attribute higher authority either to the earlier or to the later document. Barring such complications as radiating texts, there is usually no trouble occasioned by altered accidentals. Unless they are connected to altered substantives, they are usually not considered as possible emendations, being likely to have resulted from the mechanical processes of typing or typesetting, or the imposition of a house style. But typically with changed words the editor finds a mixture of alterations, some of which are characteristic of the author and many of which are not — or not especially. Authors sometimes revise

and sometimes correct, making changes that an alert copy-editor or compositor or amanuensis could equally have made. What to do in this situation? 'Both a meat-cleaver and a scalpel cut', says a friend of mine, 'but the scalpel does the finer job'. Bowers had given every indication of following Greg in being in favour of the scalpel, of taking each alteration on its own merits.

Yet in 1978, in 'Greg's "Rationale of Copy-Text" Revisited', Bowers gave notice that he had shifted his position — in a number of quite significant ways. In the article he devotes the kind of attention to Greg's wording as is usually saved for biblical or canonical texts, subjecting his every remark to the intensest scrutiny. Now in his seventies, Bowers was signalling that the articles of association bonding the firm of Greg and Bowers were being renegotiated. Bowers notes that Greg did not discuss the question of the authority of an autograph manuscript as compared to that of printed editions (and thus did not address a central consideration in the choice of copy-text for editors of later literature), and that, in any case, Greg seems in the 'Rationale' 'more concerned with [the] matter of editorial freedom of judgment than he is with the narrower matter of copy-text choice' (1978, p.92). Furthermore, Greg 'makes no claims for the specific recognizable authority in the copy-text accidentals and regards their reproduction as more significant of the time (and locality of a scribal manuscript) than of the author, at least in any identifiable form' (1978, p.96) — thus markedly reducing the relevance of Greg's ideas for later editors. And 'Greg talks always in terms of spellings and not of the interest that may lie in the preservation of the punctuation of the period' (1978, p.126). But despite this catalogue of telling criticisms or limitations, Bowers still maintained that copy-text could be chosen 'on the basis of its accidentals according to Greg' (1978, p.147) in cases where the author had revised proof intensively and the printer had followed copy relatively faithfully. It was the editor's business, having collated the earlier and later texts, to separate the classes of variant accidentals clearly assignable to the author from those assignable to the compositor, and then to decide from the re-mainder which text probably contained a majority of the authorial variants. It would become the copy-text. This was not the direction in which many editors had assumed Greg's rationale to tend.

In time-honoured exegetical tradition, Bowers was making the canonical text yield sense rather than finding it there. But if so, why had he gone to such trouble and so late in the day virtually to show the door to the erstwhile senior partner in the firm? Bowers's iconoclasm becomes less surprising when it is realised that his object was (as I read it) to remove Greg's 'Rationale' as a prop on which modern editors might lean to justify refusals to depart from readings in the copy-text (typically, the autograph manuscript, another early state or first edition). He wanted to provide grounds for editors to feel free to depart from documentary readings whenever their sense of the author's intentions demanded it.

Bowers had no doubt been influenced by his experience of editing the works of William James — who had usually revised his periodical articles heavily before submitting them for book publication. Bowers confides that he at first tried to apply the 'more common Greg rationale and insert substantive book revision in the journals used as copy-texts' (1978, p.131 n.34), but then reversed his approach. He

also reveals that his experience as textual consultant for the Wesleyan-Clarendon edition of *Tom Jones* and *Joseph Andrews* (where in both cases revisions were evident in each succeeding edition until the fifth) was influential. Many revisions were merely 'a polishing and refinement of the language and syntax' (1978, p.159). Bowers's 'uneasiness about the authority of various small changes, combined with the powerful influence Greg's precept about indifferent choices then exercised on [his] thinking' (1978, p.159) led him to advise caution in the acceptance of revisions into the first edition copy-texts. This advice he later regretted when he came to edit *Tom Jones* himself for it had led to the exclusion of too many 'neutral-seeming revisions' in *Joseph Andrews* (1978, p.159). His conclusion was a reversal of Greg's tendency to respect the reading in the copy-text in cases where variants could not be assigned with probability to the author: 'I now believe that an editor is better advised to give the benefit of the doubt to the readings of the revised edition provided he has some reasonable faith in the general fidelity of its compositors to copy and believes that the author was capable of making the changes in question. On the whole, this applies to accidentals as well as to substantives and hence may lead to a selection of the revised edition as copy-text, in which case an editor may return to Greg's conservatism but in the reverse direction' (1978, pp.159-60). Given Bowers's arguments about the strict inapplicability of Greg's position to modern literature and Greg's defence of an editorial liberalism against McKerrow, Bowers would have done better to say 'Gregian conservatism' rather than 'Greg's'. His essay allows one to insist on a distinction between Greg's 'Rationale' (as limited historically to its moment of composition) and what people have made of it over the years. That text has had a remarkable life.

The repeated reminder in the essay that it was Greg who advocated editors' eclectic treatment of variant substantives on an individual basis, taken together with Bowers's declaration of an orientation in favour of revised editions, suggests that Bowers was suspicious of his own earlier endorsement of Greg's advocated position about variant substantives. He was admitting in the essay an earlier orientation which he was now reporting having relinquished. The existence of the orientation (against altering the copy-text) suggests that he had all along endorsed Greg's position without finding it possible to enter fully into its eclectic and liberal spirit. Bowers was now merely announcing the advisability of a different orientation.

This situation is worth reflecting on. There was never any disagreement that analytical bibliography must be brought to bear in narrowing the range of an editor's decisions about whether or not to incorporate variant readings into the copy-text. Information about what could have happened in the printery or publishing house, about the range of possibilities, places useful limits on speculation. But those limits only hover over the editorial problem area. One does not want to be thought a sissy, but it does seem to me that the exceptions to the declared orientation are the crucial element. Every variant is one of the potential exceptions, and thus the editor's job is apt to be (or least can be) more sensitised than a declaration of intent might make it appear. The balancing of probabilities has to be gone through and adjudicated upon for every case. I wonder, then, whether there was not always a touch of melodrama in the polarising of the editor's sanguinary

options (meat-cleaver versus scalpel). Editors who do not declare an orientation usually find themselves creating rules of thumb to discriminate between the variants anyway: consistency, however subdivided and refined and variegated, is not an ideal that editors readily forgo. Indeed, it seems to me that judging a variant independently 'on its merits' — as Greg advised and Bowers originally endorsed — will rarely be possible because no variant is an island. Its merits refer to, confirm or question the merits of many of the other variants about which decisions are also being made. The problem is relative, not absolute. Following Greg's advice to the letter will usually be impossible.[8]

If, in the 1978 essay, Bowers could not finally bring himself to shift editorial decision-making into the harsh light of a somewhat unearthly new day (where 'all rules are off', 1978, p.161 n.56), he had at least removed the comfort of the Gregian shade. His campaign continued. In 1985 he commented:

> The full implications of authorial intention involve more than the choice among variant substantives: when applied as well to the more treacherous case of accidentals, the regularization of these variables toward authorial characteristics has been treated by editors with undue caution since its textual authority may run contrary to documentary authority, that stalwart reed. (1985, p.5)

In distinguishing between textual and documentary authority, Bowers was reaching for a theoretical way of justifying his instinct that the 'broad' principle of 'the reconstruction . . . of authorial intention' (or what he would describe in 1990 as 'the transfer of the intended sense', p.85), should prevail over editors' characteristically 'narrow' methodology (1985, p.2). His old enemy (adapting Greg's) had been what he believed was the conservatism of editors choosing first or later editions as copy-texts partly on the grounds that the author had given overall approval to the relevant proofs, despite the fact that earlier states, closer to the autograph manuscript (or the manuscript itself), were extant.[9] The disinclination of editors to alter authorial inscriptions found in their copy-text (chosen, in the Gregian way, as the early state) was the latter-day enemy. Bowers's notion of 'textual authority' was doubtless an attempt to posit a justification for editors to feel able to resign what he was warning was their excessive respect for the readings in the copy-text document.[10]

This respect was one he had formerly felt paramount. In 1962, in stating 'Some Principles for Scholarly Editions of Nineteenth-Century American Authors', Bowers declared: 'One may safely say that nothing in the spelling, punctuation, capitalization, word-division, or paragraphing of nineteenth-century books is likely to cause a presentday reader any difficulty' (1962:2, p.194). His example, *The House of the Seven Gables* with its several thousand variants caused by the printer, required the editor to respect 'what [Hawthorne] wrote in the manuscript and manifestly preferred . . . Thus the editor must choose the manuscript as his major authority' (1962:2, p.198). In this essay Bowers laid down the law: 'only this editorial process scrupulously carried out will produce editions of American classics that will stand the test of time and, heaven willing, need never be edited again from the ground up' (1962:2, p.201). By 1985 he may have felt he had been too strict, and in doing so had influenced others to be doctrinaire in the matter of respect for copy-text: this

would account for his truculent remark about American textual critics' 'obsession' with copy-text.[11] And hence his distinction between textual authority and documentary authority: the concepts were apparently to be a subdivision or dual manifestation of authorial intention, with the editor free to appeal to one or the other in the service of the overriding goal.

At the next STS conference in 1987, Bowers, now 82, continued his tack by defending the practices of regularisation and even normalisation. Because inconsistencies in spelling, word-division and habits of punctuation, deriving from, say, the author's manuscript, might trouble readers and cause them to lose confidence in the text they would be reading, Bowers proposed that editors should think of themselves as 'enlightened copy-reader[s]'. He admitted that it is 'not an immediately appealing concept, but within rational (meaning flexible) bounds it is not only true but even desirable' (1987, p.82). Editors use critical judgment in the incorporation of substantives from later states into the copy-text. Therefore, he argued, why should they not go one step further and impose a consistency by adjusting the accidentals in accordance either with a known authorial practice present, as a majority or minority usage, in the copy-text (regularisation) or by appeal to some external standard, even when the usages imposed have no precedent in the copy-text or associated documents (normalisation)? Bowers gives a wide interpretation to regularisation. Many editors do not take it further than imposing the *majority* practice of the accidentals of the copy-text. The Cambridge University Press Lawrence edition (which takes this approach) gave up regularising manuscript word-division after it was realised that Lawrence's variant hyphenations appeared to be, at least occasionally, meaning-bearing. Dialect and slang spellings are also respected; and, more generally, if there is a possible distinction in intended meaning between an eccentric accidental and the normal form, it is not emended. Characters are even allowed to have 'brother-in-laws' in *The Boy in the Bush*.

Around the 1912-1915 period, Lawrence appears to have distinguished between levels of indentation for new paragraphs, but not consistently. Narrative is indented in his autograph manuscripts in the normal way, but direct speech is often doubly indented, giving it something of the visual character of a quotation. And occasionally Lawrence would introduce (perhaps deliberately) new paragraphs beginning at the left-hand margin. So far, these forms have been regularised to the standard one on the grounds that Lawrence was probably not trying to inaugurate a new typographic convention. Right or wrong: who knows? Perhaps Lawrence did intend (or was only half-aware that he was intending) a nesting of direct speech within the narrative, indicating 'levels' of narration; if so, he would have been gradually brow-beaten by the standards of the day in which his typed and typeset copies came back to him. This might explain his inconsistencies. Compare James Joyce's certainly deliberate (and editorially preserved) use of the dash to introduce direct speech, thus allowing it to nudge quietly into the character's continuity of mental reflection or into the indirect free style of the narration.

What these examples illustrate are the dangers for editors who choose confidently to depart from inscriptions in the document. Bowers was very sharply criticised by Hershel Parker for imposing consistency on the use of dialect in *The*

Red Badge of Courage by completing a system in the use of dialect and standard English which Bowers believes Crane intended to implement when revising the manuscript but only half carried out.[12] The acrimony of the dispute can be partly attributed to the pressure imposed by the unchallenged assumption that there can be only one *Red Badge*. Parker identifies it as lying in the autograph manuscript before Crane's somewhat haphazard revision of it, Bowers in the manuscript as authorially revised and cut, and Donald Pizer in the Appleton edition of 1895.[13] According to Parker, 'in the manuscript Crane at the end is ironically and blasphemously mocking Henry Fleming's self-delusions . . . while in the printed book Henry's opinion of himself seems to have sudden and anomalous support from the author'.[14] Does Fleming find manhood in battle, or does he not?

Whatever one's view of the matter, it is true that Bowers's retrieval of a single text to represent the literary work necessitated unusually heavy editorial emendation. The reader of the critical edition will have considerable difficulty retrieving what was in the manuscript; the reader of an authorised reprint (minus the apparatus) will, of course, have no chance. In the Lawrence case, the reader will probably never pause to reflect on a subtlety of narration Lawrence may have hoped to achieve. In the case of early *printed* matter, layout, typography and the exigencies of line justification are all being shown, in work by such people as D.F. McKenzie and Randall McLeod, as meaningful, though by whom the meaning is or was intended is sometimes a moot point.[15]

Should this kind of attention also to be paid to manuscripts? The CEAA *Statement of Editorial Principles and Procedures* defines 'questions of typography or design' as non-textual;[16] but that understanding would have ruled out my differentiating between the setting-out of the closes of letters in *The Boy in the Bush* written by Jack Grant and his father (whom Jack has approached for a remittance). In the manuscript, Jack's closes vary in their positioning as if, young man as he is, he has not yet settled on a ceremonial form; his father's three-line close is, in contrast, more carefully placed in progressive indentations across the page.[17] Lawrence's original printers followed their house style, and the distinction was lost. I was, of course, preparing a critical edition as a printed book, not a type facsimile of the manuscript. Nevertheless I reinstated the manuscript styling as best I could. Because a decision had to be made about setting-out the letters, one that roughly imitated the manuscript's seemed to me to better than the arbitrary one which a Cambridge University Press copy-editor would otherwise have imposed. And I made similar decisions, of which the reader is informed in the 'Note on the Text', for the setting out of the novel's quotations of songs and the Bible, and blank lines in the manuscript indicating breaks within otherwise signalled section breaks. I respected the authority of the document, feeling that, more likely than not, I was also, in Bowers's terms, respecting the authority of the text.

Editors can of course be over-sensitive to such matters (which is Bowers's target in the 1985 and 1987 essays), but they can also be obtuse. The first tendency can make for momentary glitches in the reading of the critical text because of inconsistencies of presentation (Bowers stresses these: 1987, pp.82-83). The second can forever deny readers access to meanings in the manuscript which the editor, acting

as ideal copy-reader, overlooked in his or her pursuit of a consistent presentation. The second tendency strikes me as more bibliophilic than editorial. Featherbedding the readers of one's edition is not the way, in my opinion, to challenge them to go beyond the reading text to the apparatus, and thereby to encourage their gradual acquisition of a familiarity with the compositional growth of the literary work. (I feel that it is advisable, nevertheless, to warn readers at the beginning that inconsistencies are present because they reflect authorial or, at least, period practice.)

This choice between the two tendencies points at a deeper problem which I cannot find that Bowers ever faced: the hidden and even treacherous doubleness of the traditional standard of creating a reading text that the author would have wanted published, or, as Bowers put in 1985, 'the text by which [the author] would wish to be judged by posterity' (p.3). The standard *seems* straightforward, indeed the natural one to aim at; but is it?[18] In the case of Shakespearean texts, Bowers observed in 1978 that 'an editor is forced to choose the Quarto versions as copy-texts, regardless of any other considerations (except for 'bad quartos') because they alone have transcriptional links that ultimately tie them with the holographs' (1978, p.106). Moreover holograph manuscripts give us the most intimate connection to authorial intention (even though that intention is something we must construct in the present). Nevertheless, authors realise that their manuscripts will undergo the normal processes of publication. So that the banner of authorial intention contains from the outset two standards: authorial inscription on the one hand and social-isation of those inscriptions (through the collaborative and social institution of publishing) on the other.[19] Therefore it is a confusion to claim, as Jerome McGann is tempted to do, that Bowers's standard of authorial intention simply repeats an underlying Romantic ideology of the creative inspiration and autonomy of the individual artist.[20] Indeed, if you try to pin Fredson Bowers's colours to the purely authorial mast, they come away in your hand. He actually acknowledged dual sources of textual authority while understanding that he paid allegiance only to one: in 1985, he summed it up, stirringly: 'The great principle of the search for authorial integrity, which is to say for authenticity, remains forever constant' (1985, p.11).

This hidden doubleness is writ large in editors' decisions about the order in which to print a writer's poems, essays or short stories: according to their order of composition ('purely' authorial) or according to the original units of publication in which readers have come to know them over the years (as socialised). The decision here can cut across the standard according to which the reading text is established. Thus Colin Roderick took the important decision to edit, for the first time, Henry Lawson's short stories in the order, roughly, in which they were written (authorial), but chose as his copy-texts the last version in which Lawson is known to have had a hand, versions into which the alterations of various compositors and magazine editors had been incorporated (socialised).[21]

T.H. Howard-Hill has pointed out that editors inevitably mediate between the textual documents and a modern audience.[22] Editors' business is not purely historical. Or rather, one can add, there is no such thing as *purely* historical

scholarship. Inevitably it is carried out in the present and according to aims and standards negotiated by practitioners in the field, and it is limited in its presentation by the printing technology of the day and by the prescriptions of publishers. But this line of observation only postpones the crucial question of ascertaining the standard according to which the 'historical' scholarship will proceed. To take the regularising and normalising route is to tie one's edition to the publishing expectations of today — or, rather, to one's interpretation of them — because one is worried about the convenience of today's reader ('a user's sense of pleasure as well as profit', as Bowers puts it, 1987 p.81). It is another thing to take advantage of the publishing possibilities of today so as to allow the reader access to the texture of the original and unchanging documentary inscriptions. To pursue the regularising line is to exacerbate the inherent disrespect for versions of the eclectic, copy-text method by a further mixing of the accidentals of the copy-text with those from an editorial source: the editor's sense of what was the author's practice, a judgment which depends on the further, questionable assumption that the author would have been or wanted to have been consistent in that practice at the point of emendation. I am left wondering, indeed, whether the normalising pursuit is not a form of editorial hubris, while simultaneously appreciating why it needed someone of Bowers's self-confidence and intelligence to posit, if not to my mind a convincing, then certainly a plausible, justification of it, and despite the likely unpopularity of the view.

Bowers's image of the eclectic editor as enlightened copy-reader accepts the logic of one emphasis in the (incorrigibly) double standard of authorial intention. Editors who refuse to regularise or normalise accept the alternative emphasis. Bowers was able, over the years, to shift gradually from one to the other, without deserting the banner of authorial intention, because of the latitude allowed by the inherent doubleness of the standard. His flexibility of approach was possible in part because he took the standard as a given rather than one to be philosophically explored. Bowers's concentration on questions of editorial methods and standards was not accompanied by an equivalent, philosophic interest in their underlying assumptions. The lack of such a sustained exploration finally left him vulnerable. I have already outlined in general terms how the intellectual sands had shifted around him as he worked, questioning his positivist assumptions. Some more particular questions can also be raised.

Provided a revision could be proved or deemed authorial and did not cause outright error, Bowers saw no alternative but to meld it with the copy-text. It did not matter that the revision would often, as in the case of *Joseph Andrews*, be 'finicky' (1978, p.159) and therefore represent a form of textual engagement on the part of the author only distantly related to that which had produced the manuscript. In copy-text editing, revision is — dubiously in my opinion — equated in importance with composition. The two are given a seamless continuity by the editor in the reading text. In the process, textual authority and textual ownership are being confused. The two are not always clearly distinguishable (we attribute both, sometimes interweaving them around one another); but where a distinction can be drawn, it has the potential to be a clarifying one. Appeals to textual ownership

most obviously undergird arguments for copy-text based on an author's general approval of a set of proofs (the author had the right to so approve because the text was his or hers). Bowers vigorously contested that argument, but did not question the paler version of the appeal involved in the incorporation of authorial revisions, into a copy-text — even if they amounted only to a form of tinkering. Because *Joseph Andrews* was Fielding's novel to do what he liked with, his 'finicky' revisions should have been (according to Bowers) duly incorporated into the copy-text — whose textual authority is of a wholly different order, hardly related to *ownership* at all. The justifying link between textual ownership and authority is not made explicit in such decisions, but it is, I suspect, in silent operation nevertheless.

For first-time readers and students, and literary critics requiring a common point of reference, the eclectically-constructed reading text probably remains a practical necessity, superior to simple reprints in its ability to include an author's punctuation, wording and revisions while excluding the alterations of others involved in book production. But disquiets such as the ones I have mentioned (together with the more general ones I outlined above) led me to predict in *Editing in Australia* that we will be less and less likely to mistake a reading text for the literary work, or to claim that, by itself, the reading text is a satisfactory representation of it. I remarked that textual apparatuses are, correspondingly, likely to take on an increasing importance in years to come — a tendency which, I further predict, the electronic edition, when it is invented, will palpably demonstrate by giving immediate access, at any one point, to alternative versions of the reading text.[23] Users of the electronic edition will rapidly realise that the reading text is only the primary point of entry to the work, an awareness the present volume format militates against.

Fredson Bowers may not have agreed; but he would, I feel sure, have been curious, enquiring, reflective about the new editorial technology. His written response would have been worth having.

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NOTES

1. The statistics tell something of the story: I can find database listings for 47 books, critical editions, other editions, or collections of essays and articles by or edited by Bowers including a 15-page monograph on Ben Jonson of 1937. The *Arts and Humanities Citation Index*, which is fairly comprehensive from 1980, lists 327 citations by other writers of his work.
2. Citations of the following articles by Bowers are referred to in the text and notes by year and page number:

   '1950': 'Current Theories of Copy-Text, with an Illustration from Dryden', *Modern Philology*, 68(1950): 19-36, reprinted in *Bibliography and Textual Criticism: English and American Literature, 1700 to the Present*, ed. O.M. Brack, Jnr. and Warner Barnes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), pp.59 -72.

'1962:1': 'Established Texts and Definitive Editions', *Philological Quarterly*, 41(1962): 1-17.
'1962:2': 'Some Principles for Scholarly Editions of Nineteenth-Century American Authors' [A paper given in 1962 to a Modern Languages Association meeting], *Studies in Bibliography*, 17(1964): 223-28; reprinted in *Bibliography and Textual Criticism*, pp.194-201.
'1972': 'Multiple Authority: New Problems and Concepts of Copy-Text', *The Library*, 5th ser., 27(1972): 81-115.
'1978': 'Greg's "Rationale of Copy-Text" Revisited', *Studies in Bibliography*, 31(1978): 90-161.
'1985': 'Unfinished Business' [Presidential Address, Society for Textual Scholarship, 26 April 1985] *Text*, 4(1988): 1-11.
'1987': 'Regularization and Normalization in Modern Critical Texts' [A paper given in 1987 to the Society for Textual Scholarship], *Studies in Bibliography*, 42(1989): 79-102.
'1990': 'The Problem of Semi-Substantive Variants: An Example from the Shakespeare-Fletcher *Henry VIII*', *Studies in Bibliography*, 43(1990): 80-95.

3. Spelling, punctuation, capitalisation, word-division etc. are said to be the 'accidents' of the meaning which is carried substantively by the words ('substantives'). Greg, 'The Rationale of Copy-Text' [Delivered in 1949 to the English Institute], *Studies in Bibliography*, 3(1950): 19-36, reprinted in *Bibliography and Textual Criticism*, pp.41-58 [p.43 n.4].
4. R.B. McKerrow, *Prolegomena for the Oxford Shakespeare: A Study in Editorial Method* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), p.18.
5. Bowers, 1950, p.61 n.7. Cf. Greg, 'The Rationale of Copy-Text', pp.47-48.
6. T.H. Howard-Hill has recently argued a persuasive case along these lines: 'Modern Textual Theories and the Editing of Plays', *The Library*, 6th ser., 11(1989): 89-115. A great deal of emphasis in the Greg/Bowers approach is laid on the accidentals, perhaps more than they ought decently have been made to bear, at least with early printed literature where the best that could usually be done was to retrieve *some* of the author's accidentals – without knowing which ones.
7. In his 'Greg's "Rationale of Copy-Text" Revisited' of 1978, Bowers spoke of 'the classic Greg rationale' (p.137) as applied to the editing of nineteenth-century authors, but his primary aim in the article – to demonstrate the very reduced applicability of Greg's position – militated against the recognition of my point: 'Modern editing and Greg's rationale join in the wish to preserve as much as possible of the authorial accidentals, but they do so for different purposes (critical versus philological) and with markedly different results, even granting the information from preserved holograph documents about the accidents of a modern author available to the editor' (1978, p.127). The editor of Elizabethan literature is interested in the spelling far more than the punctuation, whereas the modern editor's priorities are usually the reverse. However this distinction has in practice been overlooked by the latter group, so convenient have they found Greg's rationale. They have given it a working rationale which Greg could not have foreseen by extending and adapting it in practice. To find fault with Greg's examples and thus identify the limitations of what he probably intended his 'Rationale' to mean, as Bowers so intently does, is not to do the same with what it has come to mean. It is not clear in the article that Bowers fully appreciated this distinction. However he does undermine the sort of appeal to Greg's position made by such modern editors as are apt to claim that it '*requires* the selection of the first edition (or of a manuscript or typescript) as copy-text, followed by the insertion of the revised substantives into this earliest accidental texture. Greg does not lay down the law' (p.128).
8. Deciding each variant purely on its merits did prove to be possible in the competing typescripts of *The Boy in the Bush* which D.H. Lawrence revised differently. But the 'merits' were chronological rather than stylistically based. (See the Cambridge University Press edition, 1990, and my 'Document or Process as the Site of Authority: Establishing Chronology of Revision in Competing Typescripts of Lawrence's *The Boy in the Bush*', *Studies in Bibliography*, 44(1991): 364-76. I argue that one can separate the '"authorial function" [when Lawrence was revising] from the "production function" [when he was acting as his own scribe] even where the evidence of the former and the requirements of the latter reside in the very same documents and where the same person – the author – discharged both' p.[364]). However, in the case of the variant revisions in the lost proof sets (witnessed by different readings in the English and American first editions), I was forced to declare an orientation (in favour of the English). I lacked the evidence which the extant typescripts had afforded me.
9. For example his references to John M. Robson's edition of the works of J.S. Mill (University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp.133-35, 145.
10. Cf. Bowers's distinction between 'textual' and 'documentary' authority with G. Thomas Tanselle's between the literary work (which remains stable but only theoretically accessible over the centuries) and documents which, always imperfectly, seek to represent it ('Textual Criticism and Deconstruction', *Studies in Bibliography*, 43(1990): 1-33). One problem with accepting Tanselle's

ideal of the work (or Bowers's 'textual authority') is that the editor may be tempted to justify departure from the sites where texts are actually written and read – i.e. the documents – on the basis of a belief in an ideal which is not substantiated (Tanselle and Bowers only assume it) and which, by Tanselle's definition, cannot be *in*stantiated. Resign that idealist belief in the work (and the positivistic assumption that a definitive edition will be the one which most closely approximates it), and departure from documentary readings becomes harder to sustain theoretically.

11. He was to state his regret at not having gone further with regularisation of accidentals in his edition of *The Scarlet Letter*. The manuscript was lost, and he had been reluctant to emend the compositor's punctuation in his copy-text to Hawthorne's practice in other manuscripts (1987, p.101 n.21).
12. 1987, pp.97-98 and n.24; H. Parker, *Flawed Texts and Verbal Icons: Literary Authority in American Fiction* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1984), chapter 6.
13. See Parker, *Flawed Texts*, pp.171-73.
14. Ibid., p.154.
15. For example D.F. McKenzie, *Bibliography and the Sociology of Texts* (London: British Library, 1985); R. McLeod, 'UN Editing Shak-speare', *SubStance*, 33/34(1981/1982): 26-55; and, as Random Cloud, 'From Tranceformations in the Text of *Orlando Furioso*', *Library Chronicle of the University of Texas at Austin*, 20(1990): 60-85.
16. New York: Modern Languages Association, 1972, p.9.
17. *The Boy in the Bush*, ed. Eggert, pp.104-7.
18. It is sometimes pointed out that there is an acknowledgement of double authority involved in choosing a first edition as copy-text over an extant manuscript on the grounds that the author anticipated, and therefore implicitly approved, the consistencies in presentation that the publisher would impose (e.g. G. Thomas Tanselle, 'Textual Criticism and Literary Sociology', *Studies in Bibliography*, 44(1991): 83-143). My point about doubleness is more general, encompassing also the preference for manuscript as copy-text.
19. Craig S. Abbott has already observed 'the extent to which authorial intention already embodies socialization'. But I feel his case is weakened by his interpretation that: 'Bowers seems to say that since the conventions of publication (and language) in the nineteenth century did not sanction irregularity in accidentals, editors might be free to regularize (regardless of the author's intention)'. ('A Response to Nordloh's "Socialization, Authority, and Evidence"', *Analytical and Enumerative Bibliography*, 1(1987): 13-16). Abbott's example is Bowers's use of a dictionary of 1813, which Hawthorne is known to have used, to normalise the author's spelling. However, Abbott's suggestion that Bowers contradicts himself ('regardless of the author's intention') ignores the latitude allowed by the doubleness of the authorial criterion.
20. J. McGann, *A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p.8.
21. Henry Lawson, *Prose Writings*, ed. Colin Roderick (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1984) and C. Roderick, *Henry Lawson: Commentaries on His Prose Writings* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1985).
22. T. Howard-Hill, 'Modern Textual Theories', p.114.
23. P. Eggert, 'Textual Product or Process: Procedures and Assumptions of Critical Editing', *Editing in Australia*, ed. Paul Eggert (Kensington, New South Wales University Press, 1990), p.36. The 'electronic' – i.e. computerised – edition could presumably be programmed in a hypertext environment because of the multiple possibilities of linking between the various levels of text. Current experiments at Australian Defence Force Academy seem to point that way.

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